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Abstract 
We investigate the unique contractual arrangement between a large Ethiopian sugar factory 
and its adjacent outgrower associations. The only significant difference between the 
sugarcane production on the factory-operated sugarcane plantation and on the outgrower-
operated plots is the remuneration system and thus, the incentives to the workers. We 
compare the productivity of the factory-operated plantation with the outgrower-operated plots 
based on a new cross-sectional plot-level data set that includes all plots that are operated by 
the sugar factory and its adjacent outgrower associations. As sugar-cane production depends 
on various exogenous factors that are measured as categorical variables (e.g. soil type, cane 
variety, etc.), we estimate the production function by a nonparametric kernel regression 
method that takes into account both continuous and categorical explanatory variables without 
assuming a functional form and without imposing restrictions on interactions between the 
explanatory variables. In order to obtain meaningful productivity measures, we impose 
monotonicity in input quantities using the constrained weighted bootstrapping (CWB) 
method. Our results show that outgrower-operated plots have−ceteris paribus−a statistically 
and economically significantly higher productivity than factory-operated plots, which can be 
explained by outgrowers having stronger incentives to put more effort into their work than the 
employees of the sugar factory.  
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa has received increasing attention from 
international donors, NGOs, and governments because it is much lower than in most other 
regions of the world and its enhancement is seen as an essential precondition for sustainable 
economic development (Collier and Dercon, 2014). An important instrument for enhancing 
productivity is the empirical analysis of productivity because it can help to improve 
managerial decisions and public policy formulation (Ferrantino et al., 1995). Increasing 
concerns regarding food security, natural resource management, and poverty reduction are 
additional reasons for a rapidly increasing interest in empirically analyzing productivity and 
efficiency in the agricultural sector (Hassine, 2009). This paper contributes to this literature, 
firstly, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the productivity of sugarcane production in 
Ethiopia and, secondly, by comparing the plot-level productivity of outgrowers and a large-
scale plantation using a flexible nonparametric kernel regression method for both continuous 
and categorical explanatory variables.  
In recent years, sugarcane production around the world has increased tremendously. The main 
driving forces behind this increase are increasing demand for sugar and sugar products and 
the use of sugarcane for biofuel (bioethanol) production. An increasing emphasis on 
sugarcane production and processing can also be observed in Ethiopia due to rising domestic 
demand for sugar, a desire for ethanol production from molasses to halt huge expenditures on 
oil imports, and the aspiration to earn foreign currency from sugar export (Lavers, 2012). 
Therefore, sugarcane production and processing is among the sub-sectors which have 
received the highest priority in the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan that the 
Ethiopian government has been implementing since 2010/2011 (MoFED, 2010).  
An increase in sugarcane production can be achieved by increasing land use for sugarcane 
production and by improving the productivity of sugarcane production. Kostka et al. (2009) 
show that about 60% of the global increase in sugar production over the last 40 years has been 
achieved through land expansion rather than through productivity gains. Msuya and 
Ashimogo (2005) show that the high growth rate in sugarcane production achieved both by 
outgrowers and estate farms in Tanzania has been attained through the expansion of land 
under sugarcane production rather than through productivity improvements. However, further 
land expansion for sugarcane production is limited by declining land availability and low 
tolerance to further damage to the environment (Msuya and Ashimogo, 2005). Hence, 
significant increases in the productivity of sugarcane production are essential for the growth 
of the sugar industry. Furthermore, the increased productivity of sugarcane production is a 
key factor in improving the competitiveness of the sugar industry on the global market. 
However, the intended increase in sugar production in Ethiopia is so large that it cannot solely 
be achieved by productivity enhancements. Thus, the land area used for sugarcane production 
is currently being rapidly increased and this has—together with other large-scale agricultural 
investments in food and non-food crop production—resulted in massive competition for land 
and water with local smallholder farmers. This situation can be observed not only in Ethiopia, 
but also in many other developing countries. Most land expansion for sugarcane production is 
through large-scale plantations, which often face strong resistance from local communities. 
Furthermore, the establishment of large-scale plantations has been highly criticized by many 
local and international NGOs for its perceived negative effects on the livelihoods of local 
communities. It has been suggested that the use of outgrower schemes can minimize the 
perceived negative effects. Abate and Teshome (2013) state that in developing countries like 
Ethiopia, where smallholder farmers take the largest share in agriculture, outgrower schemes 
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and contract farming are politically more acceptable than alternative forms of agricultural 
investments.  
The literature on outgrower schemes and contract farming has so far focused to a great extent 
on examining the income effects of these schemes (e.g. Warning and Key, 2002; Bolwig et 
al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012) and the conditions under which these schemes benefit small-scale 
farmers (e.g. Glover, 1987; Nijhoff and Trienekens, 2010; Barret et al., 2012). Few studies, 
largely unpublished, analyze the effects of outgrower schemes on productivity and very few 
investigate sugarcane productivity. Msuya and Ashimogo (2005) compare the productivity of 
sugarcane outgrowers with rice producers in India and find that rice producers have a slightly 
higher productivity. Mahadevan (2007) examines the impact of land tenure and ethnicity on 
the productivity of sugarcane in Fiji and reports that Indo Fijians are more productive than 
their native counterparts. Khan (2006) estimates plot-level productivity of sugarcane 
production by the types of water ownership and reports that the average productivity is 
highest on plots where water is sourced from privately owned tube wells. Though outgrower 
schemes and nucleus estate (i.e. vertically integrated factory-operated) production are the 
dominant forms of sugarcane production in many African countries, the relative productivity 
of these two production models has not been sufficiently examined. Hence, the aim of this 
study is to fill this gap in the literature by comparing outgrowers’ sugarcane productivity with 
the productivity of a factory-operated plantation in Ethiopia. Our theoretical considerations 
are based on principal-agent theory and they suggest that outgrower plots should have a 
higher productivity than factory-operated plots. We test this hypothesis in our empirical 
analysis.  
Our study is distinct from previous studies in three important aspects. First, in our study, the 
outgrowers and the factory have similar plot sizes, produce the same crop, have equal access 
to credit and input markets, and use the same inputs and the same technology so that the 
organizational form of the production (and hence the incentives to the workers) is the only 
significant difference between the production on the outgrower-operated plots and the factory-
operated plots. Hence, identified differences in productivity between the outgrower-operated 
plots and the factory-operated plots can be attributed to the organizational form of production 
and hence the incentives to the workers. Second, our dataset contains a wide range of plot-
level characteristics (e.g. soil type, cane variety, production cycle), which allows us to control 
for possible plot level differences. Third, we use a kernel regression method, which allows us 
to flexibly estimate the production function without imposing a priori assumptions regarding 
the functional form of the relationship between inputs and output, the influence of the 
categorical variables, and the interactions effects between all explanatory variables. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on productivity and 
its relation with incentives and moral hazard, e.g. based on principal-agent theory. Section 3 
briefly describes recent developments within the Ethiopian sugar industry and provides 
background information about the Wonji-Shoa Sugar Factory and the adjacent outgrower 
schemes. In sections 4 and 5, we describe our data set and present the econometric framework 
of our study, respectively. Our main findings are presented in section 6 while section 7 
concludes the study.  
 2. Incentives, moral hazards and sources of variation in productivity 
The relationship between farm size and productivity has been examined since the 1960s, but it 
is still one of the most debated topics in the development economics literature. Driven by the 
rapid increase in private large-scale land acquisitions, a revival in plantations and other forms 
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of large-scale commercial agriculture has been observed in Sub-Saharan Africa since the mid-
2000s. Therefore, policy making for African agricultural development will continue to be 
driven by the small-scale versus large-scale farm productivity discourse (Smalley, 2013). 
Although this paper focusses on examining the effect of the organizational form of 
production3 on productivity, first we briefly review the literature on the relationship between 
farm size and productivity because the organizational form of production may be the most 
important argument for an inverse relationship.  
2.1 Relationship between farm size and productivity 
Most micro-level empirical studies that analyze the relationship between farm size and land 
productivity find an inverse relationship (e.g. Chayanov, 1926; Mazumdar, 1965; Berry and 
Cline, 1979; Collier, 1983; Cornia, 1985; Benjamin 1995; Barrett, 1996; Kimhi, 2006; and 
Barrett et al., 2010). The early explanations for the inverse relationship between farm size and 
land productivity were based on the theory of labor market segmentation or factor market 
imperfections (e.g. Sen, 1966; Mabro, 1971; Berry and Cline, 1979; Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1986; Sen, 1996; Heltberg, 1998). In these early explanations, small-scale farming was 
identified as family farms, while large-scale farming was identified as plantation-type 
production (e.g. Mabro, 1971). Family farming is based on the use of underemployed 
household labor so that it faces a lower effective labor price (lower opportunity cost of labor) 
than plantations and thus, uses more labor per area unit to produce a higher output per area 
unit than plantation-type production (Mazumdar, 1965; Sen, 1966; Mabro, 1971).  
A second group of studies (e.g. Feder, 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Ellis, 1993) uses the 
principal-agent framework to explain the inverse relationship between farm size and land 
productivity. The authors argue that household labor involves lower supervision costs and 
lower information asymmetries than hired labor because household laborers on small-scale 
farms have proper incentives to cultivate their land efficiently. We return to this in the next 
sub-section.  
The third group of explanations is related to methodological issues such as omitted variable 
biases due to missing information on soil quality (e.g. Bhalla and Roy, 1988; Benjamin, 1995; 
Lamb, 2003); measurement errors (Lamb, 2003); misspecification of the functional form of 
the production function (Lipton, 2010); and unobserved heterogeneity between farmers 
(Assuncao and Ghatak, 2003). However, some recent studies reject the claims that the inverse 
relationship is related to methodological issues. Barrett et al. (2010) include plot-level soil 
quality—obtained by laboratory soil tests—as the additional explanatory variable and 
conclude that only a very limited share of the inverse relationship can be explained by the 
differences in soil quality. By using data from a Ugandan household survey in which the 
household´s self-reported land size was complemented by plot-size measurements collected 
using the Global Positioning System (GPS), Carletto et al. (2013) argue that the inverse 
relationship cannot be explained by measurement errors in land size. They conclude that when 
more precise measures of land size are used, the evidence for an inverse relationship is even 
strengthened. Verschelde et al. (2013) investigate the relationship between the farm size and 
farm productivity of small-scale farmers in Burundi using a nonparametric regression 
approach that avoids potential bias due to the choice of an unsuitable functional form (as 
suggested by Lipton, 2010). Their findings also support the existence of an inverse 
relationship. However, based on an extensive review of the experiences of large-scale farming 
3 The organizational form of production here refers to the organizational arrangement of the sugarcane 
production, i.e. outgrower schemes and factory-operated production.  
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and plantation farming in Africa, Gibbon (2011) concludes that low productivity is not an 
inherent characteristic of large-scale farming and plantation farming. More recently, Collier 
and Dercon (2014) state that most of the literature that studies the inverse relationship 
compares very small farms with slightly larger farms, instead of comparing small-scale family 
farms with large-scale commercial plantations. 
2.2 Organizational form of production and relative productivity 
Ferrantino et al. (1995) point out that while productivity is determined by the underlying 
production technology and input quantities, other factors such as the organizational form of 
production may also influence the relative productivity of firms. The effect of the 
organizational form of production on relative productivity is most often investigated within 
the framework of principal-agent theory. The principal-agent literature mainly deals with a 
situation where the principal (the employer) contracts an agent (employee) to perform a job 
on his/her behalf (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent problem arises when: (i) there is 
disparity between the interest and objectives of the two parties; (ii) the principal does not have 
full information about the agent´s behavior, i.e. when it is technically or economically 
infeasible for the principal to precisely observe the quality of the job performed by the agent 
with regard to timing, effort exerted, and thoroughness, and; (iii) when the two parties have 
different risk strategies (i.e. risk averse, risk neutral or risk-taker) (e.g. Ross, 1973; Harris and 
Raw, 1979; Hölmstrom, 1979; Sanford and Oliver, 1983; Key and Runsten, 1999). When the 
incentives of the agent are not sufficiently aligned with the objectives of the principal to 
eliminate or mitigate the shirking of the agent, and it is too costly for the principal to monitor 
the agent´s behavior, the agent may not put his/her maximum effort into the production 
activity due to the presence of moral hazard, which results in the reduction of the principal´s 
outcome (Ross, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1989). Sharecropping, where the land owner and the farmer 
share both the output and the risk equally, is the most examined production arrangement in 
agriculture (Allen and Lueck, 1992). In the case of sharecropping, the farmer has a strong 
self-interest in a successful crop and no incentive to shirk, while the land owner can also 
assume that the farmer puts great effort into the production processes without needing to 
confirm it (Miller and Whitford, 2006).  
The incentive structures both for farm managers and laborers play an important role in 
determining farm productivity. While outgrower production and other small-scale farming 
activities are mostly based on family laborers, large-scale production depends on hired labor, 
which may decrease its relative productivity due to principal-agent problems. Large-scale 
agricultural production usually has complex management hierarchies with many layers of 
principals and agents in the principal-agent ladder4, which may also affect productivity 
(Levačić, 2009). Since family laborers are the residual claimants, they have stronger 
incentives to adjust and work hard than wage laborers who receive a fixed wage. For this 
reason, family laborers usually exercise more care, effort and judgment than hired laborers 
who may have incentives to shirk (moral hazard) and thus, require costly supervision 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Deininger, 2011). It is usually assumed that the amount of effort exerted 
by hired laborers—i.e. how hard or carefully they perform their work—depends on the level 
of supervision (e.g. Key and Runsten, 1999). Using plot-level data on Indian rice farms, 
Frisvold (1994) found that low effort exerted by wage laborers who were not sufficiently 
supervised by family laborers resulted in considerable output loss, which was greater than 
10% of the output on more than 40% of the plots. One way to increase the productivity of 
hired laborers is through incentive payments, i.e. paying laborers based on type and 
4 We illustrate this for our specific case in section 3.4 below. 
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magnitude of the task rather than a fixed wage (e.g. Paarsch and Shearer, 1999). However, 
especially in agriculture where the effect of low quality effort is not immediately observed, 
payments based on the type and magnitude of the task may not only increase the amount of 
tasks that the laborers complete per hour, but also reduce the quality of the work performed. 
Paarsch and Shearer (2000) found that although a payment system based on the magnitude of 
the task increased the productivity of tree-planting laborers by about 22.6%, only a small part 
of this could be attributed to valuable output because laborers reacted to the payment 
incentives by reducing the quality of their work. Thus, moral hazard due to principal-agent 
problems and the related labor supervision costs make the effective labor costs higher on 
large-scale farms than on smallholder plots (Feder, 1985; Smalley, 2013), which reduces the 
relative productivity of large-scale farms. Contract farming (outgrower schemes) provides an 
opportunity for smallholder farmers to take advantage of the relatively high productivity of 
family labor (Smalley, 2013). 
3. Recent development within the Ethiopian sugar sub-sector 
Ethiopia started the implementation of a five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) in 
2010/2011 with the aim of becoming a middle-income country with a climate-resilient green 
economy by the year 2025. For the duration of the GTP, the sugar sub-sector (production and 
processing of sugarcane) has been given top priority together with a few other sub-sectors 
such as the textile industry, and the meat and leather processing industry. Compared to the 
recent development in the sugar sub-sector, development has been very slow both in terms of 
the area under production and the number of factories from the establishment of the first 
commercial sugarcane production in 1953 until 2006. However, rapid development within the 
sugar industry has taken place in the previous decade: the construction of the largest sugar 
factory in the country (Tendaho Sugar Factory) started in 2006 with the first phase being 
completed in 2014; two existing sugar factories (Metahara and Fincha Sugar Factories) were 
considerably renovated and extended from 2009 to 2013; the oldest Ethiopian sugar factory 
(Wonji-Shoa Sugar Factory) was replaced by a new and much larger sugar factory in late 
2014 (see next subsection); and the construction of 11 new sugar factories started in 2011.5 
Table 1 summarizes the sugarcane land area and the sugar and ethanol production capacity of 
the existing sugar factories and the new sugar factories that are currently under construction.  
Table 1. Sugarcane production area and sugar and ethanol production capacity of the existing 
and new sugar factories in Ethiopia 
 
Mid 2014 Plan until 2020 
Number of sugar factories 4 15 
Area under outgrowers and large-scale 
sugarcane production (ha) 37,131 452,819 
Annual sugarcane production (1000 tons) 300 4,300 
Electricity generation (megawatts) 62 600 
Annual ethanol production (million liters) 11.1 182 
Employment in the sugar sector 69,254 ˃250,000 
Source: Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (2014) 
5 Five factories in the South Omo Zone, three factories in Tana Beles in the Amhara Regional State, one factory 
in Arjo Didessa in Oromoa Regional State, one factory in Welkayt in Tigrai Regional State, and one factory in 
Kesem in Afar Regional State (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2014). Six of the new factories are expected to 
commence production in 2015/16. The construction of the remaining five factories is expected to be finalized by 
2020. The total investment in the construction of these 11 sugar factories is estimated to be around 5 billion $US 
(Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2014).  
6 
 
                                                          
Ethiopia has one of the highest sugarcane yields (land productivity) in the world (see 
Figure 1). While Ethiopia exports a small part (about 7% in 2013) of its sugar production to 
the European Union (EU) to take advantage of the duty-free and quota-free access for sugar 
exports from developing countries, it imported more than half of its domestic sugar 
consumption in 2013. However, the Ethiopian sugar sub-sector aims to become self-sufficient 
and to start exporting sugar (in addition to the preferential exports to the EU) in 2015.  
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2013) 
Figure 1. Average sugarcane yield in the period 2008-2012 in tons per hectare for the five 
countries with highest sugarcane yield and the two largest sugarcane producers in the world 
(Brazil and India). 
3.1. Wonji-Shoa Sugar Factory 
When the Wonji Sugar Factory began production in 1954 it was the first sugar factory to be 
established in Ethiopia (Ethiopian Investment Agency, 2012). In order to meet the increasing 
demand for sugar in the country, the Shoa Sugar Factory was set up in 1962 under the same 
management about 7 km away from the Wonji Sugar Factory. The two factories (Wonji and 
Shoa) together cultivated about 5,900 ha of sugarcane on their own plantations and had a joint 
crushing capacity of 3,000 tons of cane per day. In late 2014, the two sugar factories were 
closed down and replaced by a new Wonji-Shoa sugar factory, which has a crushing capacity 
of 6,250 tons of cane per day; more than double the joint cane crushing capacity of the two 
previous sugar factories. In addition to its own production, the factory also sources sugarcane 
from outgrowers. The geographic location of the Wonji-Shoa sugar factories, their factory-
operated plantation and the plots of the adjacent outgrowers are illustrated in Figure 2. 
3.2. Sugarcane Outgrower Schemes in the Wonji-Shoa Area  
The land area used by the factory for sugarcane production has remained the same since the 
1960s due to a lack of unoccupied land in the vicinity of the factory that is suitable for 
sugarcane production. In order to increase the supply of sugarcane, seven sugarcane 
outgrower associations were established in 1975/76. Participation in the outgrower scheme 
was not on a voluntary basis. In the selected villages, all farmers who had suitable land for 
sugarcane production had to join the scheme or leave their land. The schemes were designed 
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in such a way that all farmers in a given outgrower association were allocated an equal 
amount of land regardless of the amount of land they originally contributed to the association. 
However, the amount of land owned by the outgrowers varies depending on the association 
and ranges between 0.2 and 6.0 ha. The sugarcane fields are jointly managed by the sugarcane 
outgrowers. Unless the outgrowers face a shortage of labor—which sometimes happens 
during peak planting and weeding seasons—the outgrowers undertake all the labor work on 
their plots except for harvesting, which is done by factory laborers. All sugarcane outgrowers 
are supposed to undertake the same amount of work, which can be on their own land or on 
other parts of the same plot that belong to other members of their outgrower association. The 
outgrowers receive a down-payment for their work on the sugarcane fields based on a fixed 
daily rate or according to the piece of work they have performed. After harvesting the 
sugarcane, the profit made on the plot (i.e. the revenue from selling the sugarcane minus all 
costs and the down-payment for the labor) is shared among all owners of the plot according to 
their share of land on the plot. Hence, this outgrower arrangement is a form of co-operative 
farming. The sugarcane productivity has a large effect on the outgrowers’ income because 
nearly 60% of the land that is cultivated by the outgrowers is used for sugarcane production 
and more than 50% of the outgrowers do not grow any crops other than sugarcane. 
 
Source: provided by Beshir Kedi Lencha, Wonji-Shoa Sugar Factory 
Figure 2. Map of Wonji-Shoa sugar factories, factory-operated plantation, and plots of 
outgrowers.  
In order to further increase the supply of sugarcane, additional outgrower associations were 
established in 2008, 2011, and 2013 and this process is still going on. In the 2013/14 
harvesting season, outgrowers supplied about 40% of the total cane that was crushed by the 
Wonji-Shoa Factory. Table 2 presents a summary of the outgrower associations that are 
attached to the Wonji-Shoa sugar factory.  
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Table 2. Overview of sugarcane outgrower schemes of the Wonji-Shoa sugar factory  
Year of 
establishment 
Area Distance 
to factory 
Number of 
associations 
Area 
(in ha) 
Number of 
outgrowers 
1975  <10 km 7 1,124 1,516 
2008  <10 km 5 1,690 1,172 
2011 Dodota <25 km 4 1,726 1,034 
2013- Welenchiti 42 km * 4,479 * 
Note: the year of establishment indicates the year when the outgrowers planted sugarcane for 
the first time; * = not known yet. 
Source: Information from the Wonji Area Sugarcane Growers Union 
3.3. Contractual Arrangement of the Outgrower Schemes in the Wonji-Shoa Area 
The Wonji-Shoa sugar factory and the Wonji Area Sugarcane Growers Union6 have a formal 
contract that is renegotiated every three years. The sugar factory provides the outgrowers with 
all inputs used in sugarcane production such as cane seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
machinery, where the contract specifies standard input quantities per hectare that outgrowers 
are supposed to apply. The contract also determines the prices of these inputs, the sugarcane 
price, the tasks that the outgrower associations have to perform, farm management plans, 
wage rates for harvesting and the down-payments for the outgrowers’ work , and payment 
rates for different overhead costs for the three-year contractual period. All input costs 
(including the down-payments for the outgrowers’ work) are initially disbursed by the 
factory. When the sugarcane of a plot has been harvested, the factory calculates the value of 
the sugarcane, deducts all corresponding advance payments, and transfers the remainder to the 
Wonji Area Sugarcane Growers Union, which then transfers the money to the outgrower 
associations.  
Although the outgrower associations have their own supervisors, the Wonj-Shoa Factory 
assigns its own supervisors to monitor the outgrowers’ sugarcane production activities, e.g. 
the amount of labor and other inputs. All production activities from land preparation to 
harvesting are jointly planned and managed by the outgrower associations’ management 
committees, agronomists employed by the Wonji Area Sugarcane Growers Union, and the 
outgrowers department of the Wonji-Shoa factory. The outgrowers are required to sell all 
their output (sugarcane) to the factory. The sugarcane outgrower associations have the land-
use rights (ownership) as a whole, but not the individual members so that the individual 
outgrowers do not have the decision power to renew or reject the contract when it expires. 
Since there is no exit option, in practice the farmers are locked into a lifelong contract to 
supply sugarcane to the factory. 
3.4 Principal-Agent Relationships 
We illustrate the principal-agent relationships in the Wonji-Shoa factory-operated plantation 
and in the outgrowers’ sugarcane production in Figure 3. The left-hand side of the figure 
demonstrates that factory-operated sugarcane production has many layers of principal-agent 
6 In the year 2000, all outgrower associations that produced sugarcane for the Wonji-Shoa sugar factory formed 
the Wonji Area Sugarcane Growers Union. All newly established outgrower associations have joined the union 
which negotiates with the factory on behalf of all the outgrowers and also supports the associations with 
extension services. 
9 
 
                                                          
relationships. In all these layers, there is information asymmetry as the principal does not 
have full information about how the agents at the lower level act. Thus, there is the potential 
for moral hazard at every level of the principal-agent relationships.  
In contrast, the right side of the figure demonstrates that the outgrower schemes have far 
fewer layers of principal-agent relationships. Furthermore, information asymmetry between 
the principal and the agent is lower than in the factory-operated sugarcane production as the 
principals and agents live in the same village and know each other much better than the 
principals and agents in the factory-operated sugarcane production. Moreover, the members of 
the outgrower associations have high incentives to monitor the efforts of each other (i.e. there 
is peer pressure) and of the committee members because all outgrowers who jointly cultivate 
a sugarcane plot share the profit so that the income of each outgrower depends on the effort of 
the other outgrowers. Furthermore, the members of the outgrowers’ management committees 
are also outgrowers who receive a share of the profits and moreover, if the sugarcane 
production is highly profitable, it increases their chance of being re-elected by the 
outgrowers’ general assembly for the following three-year term. 
The principal-agent relationship between the factory and the outgrower associations does not 
provide significant incentives for shirking because the information asymmetry between the 
factory (principal) and the outgrowers (agent) is very limited since the outgrowers are paid 
based on the weight of the cane that they supply to the factory, which means that the 
outgrowers bear all the risks of low effort. The only risk for the factory is a low supply of 
sugarcane, which may result in low capacity utilization and thus, lower profits for the sugar-
factory. 
 
  Factory   Outgrowers 
Council of Ministers        General Assembly of Outgrowers 
Director of Ethiopian Sugar Corporation      Management Committee (Board) 
 Manager of Wonji-Shoa Sugar Factory      Outgrowers 
 Heads of Agricultural Operation Departments  
 Field Supervisors 
Foremen/Capos 
Assistant foremen/Capos 
 Hired Laborers 
Figure 3. Principal-agent relationships in factory-operated and outgrower-operated sugarcane 
production in Wonji-Shoa. 
Based on the literature reviewed in section 2, the contractual arrangement described in 
section 3.3 and the principal-agent relationships presented in this section, we expect that the 
productivity will be—ceteris paribus—higher on outgrower-operated plots than on the 
factory-operated plantation.  
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4. Data 
In our empirical analysis, we use a new cross-sectional plot level-data set that we constructed 
based on data that we received from the Wonj-Shoa Sugar Factory and the Wonji Area 
Sugarcane Growers Union. It includes production data from all sugarcane plots that were 
harvested in the production year 2011/2012 by the factory and by six of the seven “old” 
adjacent outgrower associations that were established in 1975, while production data of one of 
these old outgrower associations was not available.7 Our data set consists of 377 plots of 
which 54 are outgrower-operated plots and 323 are factory-operated plots.8 We excluded five 
factory-operated plots from our empirical analysis, because we identified them as outliers.9 
Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 3. 
Our data show that the outgrowers achieve a much higher sugarcane yield (measured in 
quintals per ha; one quintal = 100 kilogram) than the factory. As the sugar content in the cane 
is about the same for outgrowers and the factory, the sugar yield is also much higher for 
outgrowers than for the factory. The inputs used in the sugarcane production are aggregated 
into four categories: land area (plot size), labor, intermediate inputs, and machinery. Labor 
input is computed as the total expenditure on labor (i.e. all labor costs related to sugarcane 
production starting from land preparation up to and including harvesting). Machinery input is 
measured as all the expenditures related to the use of machinery in the sugarcane production 
process. Intermediate material inputs are the total expenditure on cane seed, fertilizers, 
herbicides, pesticides and fungicides. Since the wage rates for specific sugarcane production 
activities, the input prices, and the machinery costs are the same for both the outgrowers and 
the factory-operated sugarcane production, the costs of these inputs are suitable measures of 
input quantities. While the outgrowers use significantly more labor and intermediate inputs, 
they use significantly less machinery than the factory. 
7 Our empirical analysis does not take into account the plots of the “new” outgrower associations that were 
established in 2008 and 2011 because the production on the “new” plots considerably differs from the production 
on the old plots. Furthermore, many of the new plots had not yet been harvested in the production year 
2011/2012. The most important differences between sugarcane production on the new plots and on the old plots 
are: (a) sugarcane has been grown for a much shorter time on the new plots than on the old plots, which is 
expected to result in higher productivity on the new plots; (b) most managers and laborers on the new plots have 
much less experience than the managers and laborers on the old plots, which could result in lower productivity 
on the new plots; (c) the new plots are irrigated by drip irrigation, while the old plots are irrigated by furrow 
irrigation, which could influence productivity, e.g., through labor use for irrigation and sugarcane yield. Thus, 
differences in the productivity between the new (outgrower-operated) plots and the old factory-operated plots (or 
the old outgrower-operated plots) may have many explanations so that it is impossible to identify the effect of 
contract farming on productivity based on the new plots. 
8The total sugarcane area of the six outgrower associations and the factory covered by this study are 907 ha and 
5900 ha, respectively. Our sample covers 602 ha of the outgrowers’ sugarcane fields and 4091 ha of the factory-
operated sugarcane fields. This is equivalent to 66% of the total outgrowers’ sugarcane area and 69% of the 
factory-plantation. The remaining sugarcane areas were not harvested in the production year 2011/1012 because 
sugarcane needs more than 12 months to mature (see Table 3). 
9 One plot had implausibly high labor costs, while the remaining four plots were planted with two cane varieties 
that were only used on these four plots which had extremely low yields and productivity. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the data set 
Variable Outgrowers  (n=54) 
Plantation  
(n=318) 
Total sample  
(N=372) 
P-value 
Cane yield (in quintals/ ha) 1451 (480) 1078 (357) 1132 (399) <0.001 
Field sugar (in quintals/ha) 165.1 (58.3) 123.3 (43.5) 129.4 (48.2) <0.001 
Plot size (in ha) 11.2 (4.2) 12.8 (6.6) 12.5 (6.3) 0.020 
Labor (ETB/ha) 6796 (2106) 5269 (1492) 5490 (1681) <0.001 
Intermediate inputs (ETB/ha) 5195 (1616) 3742 (1146) 3953 (1326) <0.001 
Machinery (ETB/ha) 1039 (1595) 2147 (3077) 1987 (2934) <0.001 
Duration of the growing period (months) 17.2 (3.7) 15.5 (2.8) 15.7 (3.1) 0.002 
Plots harvested after two rainy seasons (%) 46.3 28.3 30.8 0.006 
Soil types (%)  
 
  
<0.001 
 
A1 0.0 21.7 18.6  
 
A2 57.4 25.5 30.0  
 
B1.4 5.6 12.1 11.4  
 
BA2 5.6 8.4 8.0  
 
C1 31.5 32.3 32.1  
Cane varieties (%) <0.001 
 
B52-298 13.0 28.6 26.3  
 
N-14 68.5 18.8 26.0  
 
NCO-334 18.5 25.2 24.4  
 
MV 0.0 11.2 9.6  
 
B58-230 0.0 6.35 5.6  
 
CO-421 0.0 2.8 2.4  
 
Other varieties 0.0 6.8 5.8  
Production cycle (%) 0.009 
 
Plant cane 20.4 26.4 25.5  
 
First ratoon 40.7 22.7 25.2  
 
Second ratoon 27.8 24.2 24.9  
 
Third ratoon 9.3 13.6 13.0  
 
Fourth ratoon or later  1.9 13.2 11.4  
Planting/ratooning month (%) <0.001 
 
December 7.4 14.3 13.3  
 
January 33.3 17.7 19.9  
 
February 35.2 14.0 17.0  
 
March 5.6 14.0 13.0  
 
May 3.7 12.1 10.9  
 
June 1.6 11.2 9.8  
 Other months  13.5 16.7 16.2  
Gross margin (ETB/ha) 39,200 (16,246) 27,725 (11,239) 29,390 (12732) <0.001 
Notes: The output quantities and the input values reported in the table are averages. The gross margin calculation 
only considers labor, machinery, and intermediate input costs. Costs such as overhead costs (e.g. supervision 
costs), utility costs (e.g. irrigation water and electricity bills for pumping irrigation water from river), and the 
cost of transporting cane to the factory gate are not included. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. 
The P-values of numeric variables are obtained from t-tests for the equal mean values of the two production 
types (allowing for different variances in the two subsets), and the P-values of the categorical variables are 
obtained from Fisher's exact test of independence between the respective variable and the production type. In the 
production year 2011/12, 100 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) = US$ 5.66. 
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In addition to input and output quantities, our data set contains information on a wide range of 
plot-level characteristics, which could potentially influence the sugarcane yield: soil type, 
cane variety, production cycle, planting or ratooning month, duration of the growing period, 
and the number of rainy seasons that the cane passed in the field. While the duration of the 
growing period (ranging between 10 months and 25 months) is a numeric variable, the 
remaining characteristics are expressed as (ordered or unordered) categorical variables. 
Compared to the factory-operated plantation, the growing period is, on average, longer for the 
outgrowers (17.2 months vs. 15.5 months), while a much higher percentage of their cane had 
been grown over two rainy seasons (46.3% vs. 28.3.%), which may in part explain the 
outgrowers’ higher labor use and higher yields. While the proportion of different subtypes of 
loamy soils (soil types “A1,” “A2,” “B1.4,” and “BA2”) differs significantly between factory-
operated plots and outgrower-operated plots, the share of sandy soils (soil type “C1”) is 
around 32% for both factory-operated plots and outgrower-operated plots. As the first cane 
production cycle (the so-called plant crop) requires extensive land preparation with 
machinery, in contrast to the following production cycles (the so-called ratoon crops), the 
significantly higher proportion of plant cane at the factory-plantation (26.4%) compared to the 
outgrowers (20.4%) may, to a certain extent, explain the factory’s higher machinery costs. No 
planting or harvesting (and thus ratooning) takes place during the rainy season, which is July, 
August, and September.  
5. Econometric Specification 
In order to investigate the plot-level productivity of factory-operated and outgrower-operated 
sugarcane production for the Wonji-Shoa sugar factory, we estimate a plot-level production 
function with sugarcane production as output and land, labor, intermediate inputs, and 
machinery as inputs. The sugarcane production is not only affected by the level of input use, 
but may also depend on the production cycle, the planting/ratooning month, the duration of 
the growing period, the harvesting months, the soil type, and the cane variety. Therefore, our 
econometric model must take these plot-level characteristics into account. The most 
frequently used option is a parametric model specification that assumes a distinct functional 
form of the production function and includes a set of dummy variables to account for the 
categorical plot-level characteristics. This specification assumes that the plot-level 
characteristics can only affect the output level, but not the effects of the other explanatory 
variables on the output. As it is reasonable to assume that, for instance, the effect of fertilizers 
and the effect of the cane variety depend on the soil type and the production cycle, one could 
add interaction terms between the different sets of dummy variables as well as between the 
dummy variables and the continuous explanatory variables. This would correspond to 
partitioning the data set into all possible combinations of the categorical plot-level 
characteristics so that the number of observations would be insufficient to estimate the model 
in most of the combinations.  
An alternative option is to use nonparametric regression methods that can account for the 
presence of both continuous and categorical explanatory variables (Li and Racine, 2004; 
Racine and Li, 2004). These nonparametric approximations—unlike the most frequently used 
parametric counterparts—are globally flexible and allow the estimation of a potentially 
complex relationship between the dependent variable and the continuous and categorical 
explanatory variables without imposing a specific functional form so that they avoid the 
problem of functional form misspecification. Another merit of this estimator is that it allows 
the effect of one explanatory variable on the dependent variable to depend on the values of 
this and all other explanatory variables. The nonparametric regression model for both 
continuous and (unordered and ordered) categorical explanatory variables that we use in our 
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empirical application can be described following Racine and Li (2004) and Li and Racine 
(2004) as follows. Let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 represent a vector of k categorical explanatory variables for 
observation 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛𝑛}, where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 can consists of both unordered categorical variables, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢, 
and ordered categorical variables, 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜, and let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ∈ ℛ𝑝𝑝 represent a vector of the remaining p 
continuous explanatory variables. Furthermore, let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑  denote the sth component of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 and it 
is assumed that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑  can take 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ≥ 2 different values (levels), i.e. 𝑋𝑋 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 1} for 
𝑠𝑠 = 1, … ,𝑘𝑘. Defining  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐′,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑′)′, the nonparametric kernel regression model that 
admits continuous and categorical explanatory variables can be represented as: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛,  (1) 
where 𝑔𝑔(. ) is an unknown smooth function that will be determined by the data itself and 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 is 
an independent identically distributed (iid) random variable with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜎2. We 
use a local-linear approximation of the unknown regression function 𝑔𝑔(. ), i.e. 𝑔𝑔(. ) is 
approximated by a set of weighted linear regressions performed at each observation, where 
the weights of the other observations are determined by kernel functions and a vector of 
bandwidths and decrease with the distance from the respective observation.  
In our empirical application, we use the second-order Epanechnikov (1969) kernel to smooth 
the continuous explanatory variables, the kernel proposed by Racine and Li (2004) to smooth 
the ordered categorical variables, and the kernel proposed by Li and Racine (2004) to smooth 
the unordered categorical variables. In order to jointly account for multiple (continuous and 
categorical) explanatory variables, we use generalized product kernels (see, e.g., Li and 
Racine, 2003; Hall, Racine, and Li, 2004; Li and Racine, 2007).10 While the choice of the 
kernel function is usually of less importance (Silverman, 1986), the choice of the bandwidths 
is the most crucial decision in nonparametric regression (Racine, 2008). There are different 
ways to obtain the bandwidths (Racine 2008). We select the bandwidths according to the 
expected Kullback-Leibler criterion (Hurvich et al., 1998) so that—in contrast to rules-of-
thumb and plug-in methods—the smoothness and the shape of the regression function are 
entirely based on the data rather than the analyst’s arbitrary decisions. Furthermore, a data-
driven bandwidth selection is particularly desirable if categorical variables are present in the 
model since they have the ability to automatically detect and remove irrelevant categorical 
variables by smoothing them out (Hall, Racine and Li, 2004). In the nonparametric 
estimations, we use the logarithms of the input and output quantities so that the estimated 
gradients of the input variables can be interpreted as partial production elasticities. We model 
the planting month and the harvesting month as ordered categorical variables, whereas all 
other categorical variables are considered to be unordered. As the four subtypes of loamy soil 
(soil types “A1,” “A2,” “B1.4,” and “BA2”) are more similar to each other than to sandy soil 
(soil type “C1”), we use two categorical variables for the soil type: one categorical variable 
that only distinguishes between sandy soils and loamy soils and another categorical variable 
that distinguishes between all five soil types. Similarly, as the first production cycle, i.e. the 
plant crop, is quite different from the subsequent production cycles, i.e. the ratoon crops, we 
use one categorical variable that only distinguishes between plant crops and ratoon crops and 
a second categorical variable that distinguishes between all observed production cycles. 
Hence, in our empirical analysis, we estimate the regression model (1) with 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 being the 
logarithm of the sugarcane output on the plot and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 consisting of the five continuous 
10 The kernel functions that we use for continuous and categorical variables as well as the corresponding 
generalized product kernels, which are used in this paper, are presented in Appendix A. 
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explanatory variables (four logarithmic input quantities and the duration of the growing 
period), two ordered categorical explanatory variables (planting/ratooning month and 
harvesting month) and six unordered categorical explanatory variables (two variables for soil 
type, two variables for the production cycle, cane variety, production model). 
The flexibility of the local-linear nonparametric regression comes at the cost of possible 
violations of the properties of production technologies derived from microeconomic theory 
(e.g. monotonicity). As non-monotone production technologies can result in misleading 
productivity measures (Henningsen and Henning, 2009), we impose monotonicity using the 
constrained weighted bootstrapping (CWB) method proposed by Hall and Huang (2001) and 
extended by Du et al. (2013). 
Finally, we assess the statistical significance of each regressor with a nonparametric test for 
irrelevant regressors (Racine, 1997; Racine, Hart, and Li, 2006), where the bootstrap method 
based on independent identically distributed (iid) draws is used to obtain the distribution of 
the test statistic under the null hypothesis. 
6. Results 
The empirical analysis was performed within the statistical software environment “R” (R 
Development Core Team, 2013) using the add-on package “np” (Hayfield and Racine, 2008) 
for nonparametric estimations and specification tests.  
The bandwidth selection for model (1) according to the expected Kullback-Leibler criterion 
and the test for irrelevant regressors (Racine, 1997; Racine, Hart, and Li, 2006) unanimously 
indicate that the harvesting month and the subtype of the loamy soil do not significantly affect 
the yield (given that we have controlled for other variables such as the planting/ratooning 
month, the duration of the growing period, and the soil type variable that distinguishes loamy 
soils and sandy soils). Thus we removed these two categorical variables from our model.  
The optimal bandwidths that minimize the expected Kullback-Leibler criterion of the 
remaining explanatory variables are presented in Table 4.11 The bandwidths of continuous 
variables can range from zero to infinity. When the bandwidth of a continuous variable is 
more than two times the standard deviation, this variable is modeled approximately linearly 
(Parmeter et al., 2014). Therefore, we can conclude that all the continuous explanatory 
variables, except machinery, are modeled approximately linearly when holding all other 
continuous and categorical explanatory variables constant. However, in contrast to parametric 
linear regression, the slopes of the variables with large bandwidths can depend on the values 
of other explanatory variables. The bandwidths of the categorical explanatory variables can 
range from zero to one. If the bandwidth of a categorical variable is zero, the nonparametric 
regression basically splits the sample into sub-samples based on the values of this variable 
and separately estimates the model for each sub-sample. On the other hand, if the bandwidth 
of a categorical variable is one, the bandwidth selection indicates that this variable is 
irrelevant in predicting the value of the dependent variable and thus the nonparametric 
regression disregards this variable. Thus, the relatively large bandwidths of the soil type 
(loamy soil vs. sandy soil) and the planting/ratooning month indicate that the production 
functions are quite similar for the different soil types and planting/ratooning months. In 
11 We also tried to select the bandwidths by least-squares leave-one-out cross-validation, but due to many local 
minima of the objective function, the bandwidth selection was very sensitive to the starting values and we were 
unable to ensure that we reached the global minimum. This problem did not occur in the bandwidth selection 
according to the expected Kullback-Leibler criterion. 
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contrast, the rather small bandwidth of the variable that distinguishes plant crops from ratoon 
crops indicates that the production function for plant crops is quite different from the 
production function for ratoon crops. 
Table 4. Optimal bandwidths and statistical significance levels of the regressors 
Variable Bandwidth P-value 
Continuous variables   
log(plot size) ∞ 0.0902 
log(machinery) 3.066 0.0025 
log(intermediate inputs) ∞ ˂ 0.0001 
log(labor) ∞ 0.4411 
Duration of the growing period ∞ ˂ 0.0100 
Categorical variables   
Number of rainy seasons 0.269 ˂ 0.0001 
Planting/ratooning month 0.505 ˂ 0.0001 
Production cycle (plant crop vs. ratoon crop) 0.063        0.0050 
Production cycle 0.236 ˂ 0.0001 
Soil type (loamy soil vs. sandy soil) 0.443 ˂ 0.0001 
Production model (outgrower vs. plantation) 0.258 ˂ 0.0001 
Note: an infinity symbol (∞) means that the bandwidth is greater than two times the standard 
deviation of the respective variable. The P-values are obtained by the test for irrelevant 
regressors suggested by Racine (1997) and extended by Racine, Hart, and Li (2006) applied to 
the monotonicity–constrained model. 
The plot-level production function that we obtained by kernel regression with the bandwidths 
indicated in Table 4 violates the monotonicity conditions for three input variables (labor, 
machinery and intermediate inputs) at some of the observations.12 In order to make 
meaningful productivity comparisons, we impose monotonicity using the constrained 
weighted bootstrapping (CWB) method by constraining the gradients of all four input 
quantities so that they are non-negative.  
We applied the test for irrelevant regressors suggested by Racine (1997) and extended by 
Racine, Hart, and Li (2006) to the monotonicity–constrained model (see Table 4). This test 
indicates that machinery inputs, intermediate inputs, and all plot-level characteristics have a 
statistically significant effect on sugarcane production. While the effect of the plot size is only 
significant at the 10% level, the effect of the labor input is clearly statistically insignificant. 
This is probably caused by a very high correlation between the (logarithmic) plot size and the 
(logarithmic) labor input (coefficient correlation = 0.904). 
The mean values of the estimated derivatives/gradients obtained from the model with 
monotonicity imposed are given in Table 5.13 The plot size has the largest output elasticity, 
while machinery and intermediate inputs have rather low output elasticities. Although 
outgrowers use more labor and intermediate inputs than the plantation, they achieve 
considerably higher output elasticities of these two inputs, which indicates that outgrowers 
use labor and intermediate inputs more effectively than the plantation. The sums of the four 
output elasticities are mostly between 0.9 and 1.0, both for outgrower plots and for factory-
12 The distributions of the estimated gradients of the inputs and thus the prevalence of monotonicity violations 
are presented in Table B1 in appendix B. 
13 We report the mean values of the gradients estimated by the unconstrained model in Table B2 in appendix B. 
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operated plots. This indicates that there are slightly decreasing returns to plot size.14 The yield 
increases with the duration of the growing period, where the growth-rate is higher on 
outgrower plots (2.4% per month) than on the plantation (1.1% per month). If the growing 
period includes two rainy seasons, the outgrowers achieve a higher yield than with only one 
rainy season, while the sugarcane on the plantation does not gain from a second rainy season 
(within a given duration of the growing period). The optimal month for planting and 
ratooning is March, because postponing the planting/ratooning from October to March 
(holding the duration of the growing period constant) increases the yield, while postponing 
the planting/ratooning further generally decreases the yield. While outgrowers achieve a 
higher productivity with ratoon crops (particularly in the second ratoon) than with plant crops, 
the plantation generally achieves higher productivity with plant crops than with ratoon crops 
(except for the second ratoon). The productivity on sandy soils is almost 5% higher than on 
loamy soils. 
The productivity of the outgrowers' plots is on average 13.2% higher than it would have been 
if the plots had been operated by the factory. If the factory-operated plots had been operated 
by the outgrowers, the productivity on theses plots would have been on average only 2.3% 
higher (although still statistically significantly greater than zero15). The advantage of 
outgrower production is much larger on the outgrower plots than on the factory-operated plots 
(see Figure 416) because outgrower plots have a longer growing period, a higher proportion of 
ratoon crops and crops that are on the field for two rainy seasons (see Table 3) and because 
the outgrowers are particularly successful in achieving high productivity under these 
conditions (see Table 5). We find that the factory-operated plots are approximately as 
productive as the outgrowers’ plots in the first production cycle (i.e. when cultivating plant 
crops) (see Figure C3 in the Appendix C), when the duration of the growing period is short 
(max. 14 months) and there is only one rainy season in the growing period (see Figure C4 in 
the Appendix C). However, in general, the outgrowers are much more productive than the 
factory when cultivating ratoon crops and when the duration of the growing period is medium 
or long (15 or more months) and when the growing period includes two rainy seasons. 
14 We have conducted a formal test to check whether the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, 
which can be interpreted as constant returns to plot size when analyzing plot-level data. The test was conducted 
by dividing the output quantity and all input quantities by the plot size and adding the logarithmic plot size as an 
additional explanatory variable so that the regression function becomes log�𝑦𝑦 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠⁄ � = 𝑔𝑔∗�log�𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠⁄ � ,  log�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠⁄ � , log�𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠⁄ � ,log𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , … �. In case of constant returns to scale, the plot size (regressor log𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) has no effect on the 
yield per area (dependent variable log�𝑦𝑦 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠⁄ �) in the above equation. The test for irrelevant regressors 
suggested by Racine (1997) and extended by Racine, Hart, and Li (2006) rejects constant returns to scale (P-
value < 0.001). As robustness tests, we repeated this test by using one of the three other inputs (𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) instead of 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 for normalization. Constant returns to scale (plot size) are 
rejected when normalizing with 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (P-value < 0.001) and 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖  (P-value < 0.001), but not 
when normalizing with 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (P-value = 0.158). 
15 We used a t-test for paired samples to test the difference between the predicted output of factory-operated plots 
assuming that they were managed by outgrowers and the predicted output of the factory-operated plots assuming 
that they were managed by the factory. The mean of the differences is 0.023 (t = 7.011, df = 317, P-value < 
0.001).  
16 The unconstrained model gives similar results (see Figure C1 in appendix C). The distribution of these effects 
over all plots in the sample is illustrated in Figure C2 in appendix C. 
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Table 5. Mean values of the estimated derivatives/gradients of the constrained model 
Variable 
Derivative/gradient 
Outgrower Plantation 
Entire 
sample 
log(plot size) 
 
0.393 0.660 0.621 
log(machinery)  0.042 0.080 0.074 
log(intermediate inputs) 0.170 0.083 0.096 
log(labor)  0.371 0.141 0.174 
Duration of the growing period (months) 0.024 0.011 0.013 
Two rainy seasons (base = 1 rainy season) 0.042 -0.011 0.001 
Planting/ratooning months (base = previous month)    
 November 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 December 0.022 0.002 0.004 
 January 0.011 0.004 0.005 
 February 0.080 0.015 0.013 
 March 0.023 0.009 0.009 
 April -0.042 -0.011 -0.014 
 May 0.048 -0.008 -0.074 
 June -0.030 0.001 -0.001 
Production cycle (base = plant crop)    
 First ratoon 0.020 -0.095 -0.068 
 Second ratoon 0.212 0.003 0.037 
 Third ratoon -0.015 -0.051 -0.047 
 Fourth ratoon 0.028 0.005 0.006 
Sandy soil (base = loamy soil) 0.034 0.048 0.046 
Outgrower (base = plantation) 0.132 0.023 0.038 
Note: the derivatives/gradients of the logarithmic input variables are equal to the output 
elasticities of these inputs; the derivatives/gradients of the production cycle represent the joint 
effects of the two variables that indicate the production cycle.  
The empirical findings of this study confirm our hypothesis that productivity is—ceteris 
paribus—higher on outgrower-operated plots than on the factory-operated plantation. In 
particular, the outgrowers perform well compared to the plantation in situations where a lot of 
manual labor is required (e.g. in the case of ratoon crops and if the growing period includes 
two rainy seasons). 
18 
 
 
Figure 4. Effects of outgrower management (compared to factory management) on 
productivity on plots that are operated by the factory and on plots that are operated by 
outgrowers. 
Since higher productivity does not necessary mean higher profitability, we examine the gross 
margin (in ETB) of the two production models. For this analysis, we use the logarithm of the 
gross margin of the plot17 as the dependent variable and include the plot size, the number of 
rainy seasons, the soil type, the duration of the growing period, the planting/ratooning month, 
the production cycle, and the production model as explanatory variables. Except for the 
different dependent variable and the removal of the three variable input quantities (labor, 
machinery, intermediate inputs), we use the same nonparametric model specification as in our 
model for analyzing plot-level productivity. As the number of rainy seasons had an optimal 
bandwidth of one (which means that it is smoothed out) and was statistically insignificant, we 
removed it from the gross margin model. All other explanatory variables are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% significance level. The optimal bandwidths, the significance 
levels, and the mean values of the estimated derivatives/gradients for the gross margin model 
are given in Tables B3 and B4 in appendix B. 
The estimated effects of outgrower management (compared to factory management) on plot-
level gross margin are illustrated in Figure 5. Our analysis shows that outgrowers achieve a 
higher gross margin than the factory plantation. The effects of outgrower management on the 
gross margin are even greater than the effects on productivity. On plots that are operated by 
17 Gross margin per plot was calculated as the total sugarcane yield per plot (in quintals) multiplied by the price 
of cane (ETB/quintal) minus the total input costs of labor, intermediate inputs and machinery per plot (in ETB). 
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the outgrowers, the outgrowers achieve on average a 21.4% higher gross margin than the 
factory would have achieved on these plots. On plots that are operated by the factory, the 
outgrowers would have achieved on average a 7.6% higher gross margin than the factory 
achieved on these plots.18  
 
Figure 5. Effects of outgrower management (compared to factory management) on the gross 
margin on plots that are operated by the factory and on plots that are operated by outgrowers. 
 
18 The difference in the gross-margin on the factory-operated plots is statistically significant only at the 10% 
level. 
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7. Conclusion 
We applied a non-parametric kernel regression method to a new plot-level data set in order to 
compare the productivity of factory-operated and outgrower-operated sugarcane production in 
Ethiopia. Our study shows that the outgrowers achieve on average significantly higher 
productivity and a significantly higher gross-margin than the factory plantation. Our finding is 
consistent with the majority of previous studies, which suggest that small-scale farmers have 
higher productivity than large-scale production due to the high productivity of family labor 
compared to hired labor. While previous studies could only analyze the joint effect of 
incentives and access to credit and technologies, we can conclude that the identified 
productivity difference between the two production types in our study is solely caused by 
different incentive structures between the outgrowers and the laborers and managers at the 
plantation. The policy implication of this research is that the expansion of sugarcane 
production through establishing outgrower schemes may result in higher productivity than 
through extending factory-operated plantations.  
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Appendix A: kernel functions 
The univariate second-order Epanechnikov (1969) kernel for a continuous regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 =(𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , . . . ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 )′, where the first subscript indicates the observation and n indicates the number 
of observations, is given by: 
𝑤𝑤�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , ℎ𝑖𝑖� = � 3�4√5� �1 − 15�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 −𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖 �2�0         if �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 − 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐
ℎ𝑖𝑖
�
2 < 5.0
otherwise,
 
where the kernel function (weighting function) 𝑤𝑤(∙) indicates the weight of observation j in 
the local linear kernel regression at observation i and ℎ𝑖𝑖 > 0 is the bandwidth for regressor 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐.  
In a multivariate case with 𝑝𝑝 continuous regressors, 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 = (𝑋𝑋1𝑐𝑐, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐), Li and Racine (2007) 
suggest using a generalized product kernel of univariate kernel functions defined as: 
𝑊𝑊�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 ,ℎ� = �ℎ𝑖𝑖−1 𝑤𝑤�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , ℎ𝑖𝑖�𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where 𝑤𝑤(∙) is a univariate kernel function for a continuous regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 and ℎ = �ℎ1, … ,ℎ𝑝𝑝�′ 
is a vector of bandwidths, where ℎ𝑖𝑖 denotes the bandwidth parameter associated with 
regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐.  
 
For an unordered categorical regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 = (𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 , . . . ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 )′, Racine and Li (2004) propose a 
kernel function, which is a variation on Aitchison and Aitken’s (1976) kernel function: 
𝑙𝑙�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 , 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖� = �  1                         if 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 = 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖                           otherwise,  
where the kernel function 𝑙𝑙(∙) indicates the weight of observation j in the local linear kernel 
regression at observation i and 𝜆𝜆s is the bandwidth parameter for the regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢, which is in 
the range [0,1]. When λs = 0, the kernel function 𝑙𝑙(∙) becomes an indicator function, and 
when 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 1, it becomes a uniform (constant) function, i.e. the regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 is smoothed out 
(removed). 
The product kernel function for 𝑞𝑞 unordered categorical regressors 𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢 = (𝑋𝑋1𝑢𝑢, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢) is given 
as: 
𝐿𝐿�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢, 𝜆𝜆� = �𝑙𝑙�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 , 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑙𝑙(∙) is a univariate kernel function for an unordered categorical regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 and 
𝜆𝜆 = �𝜆𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞�′ is a vector of bandwidths, where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 denotes the bandwidth parameter 
associated with the regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢.  
 
For an ordered categorical regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 = (𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 , . . . ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 )′, Li and Racine (2004) propose the 
following kernel function: 
𝑙𝑙�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑜𝑜 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 ,𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖� = �1                              if 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 = 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖
|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜−𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 |                  if 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 ≠ 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 , 
where the kernel function 𝑙𝑙(∙) indicates the weight of observation j in the local linear kernel 
regression at observation i and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 is the bandwidth parameter for regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜, which is in the 
range [0,1]. Similarly to the kernel function for unordered categorical regressors given above, 
when 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 = 0, the kernel function 𝑙𝑙(∙) becomes an indicator function, and when 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 = 1, it 
becomes a uniform (constant) weight function, i.e. the regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 is smoothed out 
(removed).  
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The product kernel function for 𝑟𝑟 ordered categorical regressors 𝑋𝑋𝑜𝑜 = (𝑋𝑋1𝑜𝑜 , … ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜) is given 
as: 
𝐿𝐿��𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑜𝑜 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜 ,𝜓𝜓� = �𝑙𝑙�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 ,𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑙𝑙(∙) is a univariate kernel function for an ordered categorical regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 and 𝜓𝜓 =(𝜓𝜓1, … ,𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖)′ is a vector of bandwidths, where 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 denotes the bandwidth parameter associated 
with the regressor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜.  
 
Finally, the kernel function for the vector of mixed continuous and (unordered and ordered) 
categorical regressors, 𝑥𝑥 = (𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐,𝑋𝑋𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋𝑜𝑜), is the product of W(∙),  L(∙) and 𝐿𝐿�(∙),  given by: 
𝐾𝐾�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾 � = 𝑊𝑊�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 ,ℎ� × 𝐿𝐿�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢, 𝜆𝜆� × 𝐿𝐿��𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜 ,𝜓𝜓� , 
where 𝛾𝛾 = (ℎ, 𝜆𝜆,𝜓𝜓) is a vector of bandwidths for continuous and categorical regressors. 
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Appendix B: supplementary tables 
Table B1. Distribution of gradients of the unconstrained model 
    Minimum 
1st  
quartile Median Mean 
3rd 
quartile Maximum 
All plots 
       
 
Plot size 0.305 0.710 0.828 0.809 0.897 1.465 
 
Machinery -0.333 -0.008 0.032 0.034 0.084 0.277 
 
Intermediate 
input -0.111 0.004 0.035 0.054 0.116 0.287 
 
Labor -0.421 -0.079 -0.002 0.048 0.173 0.819 
Outgrower 
plots 
       
 
Plot size 0.305 0.387 0.487 0.507 0.593 0.793 
 
Machinery -0.334 -0.047 -0.014 -0.022 0.050 0.098 
 
Intermediate 
input -0.022 0.113 0.147 0.140 0.217 0.287 
 
Labor 0.001 0.257 0.325 0.328 0.429 0.819 
Factory-operated plots 
      
 
Plot size 0.344 0.782 0.851 0.860 0.931 1.465
 
Machinery -0.154  0.0003 0.041 0.044 0.089 0.277 
 
Intermediate 
input -0.111 -0.005 0.031 0.040 0.098 0.098 
  Labor -0.420 -0.087 -0.025 -0.001 0.092 0.448 
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Table B2. Mean values of the estimated derivatives/gradients of the unconstrained model 
Variable 
Derivative/gradient 
Outgrower Plantation 
Entire 
sample 
log(plot size) 
 
0.507 0.860 0.809 
log(machinery)  -0.022 0.044 0.034 
log(intermediate inputs) 0.140 0.040 0.054 
log(labor)  0.329 -0.001  0.049 
Duration of the growing period (months) 0.028 0.009 0.012 
Two rainy seasons (base = 1 rainy season) 0.060 -0.010 0.005 
Planting/ratooning months (base = previous month)    
 November 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 December 0.023 0.003 0.004 
 January 0.011 0.003 0.005 
 February 0.006 0.011 0.010 
 March 0.080 0.005 0.010 
 April 0.013 -0.014 -0.011 
 May 0.027 -0.091 -0.085 
 June 0.004 0.001 0.001 
Production cycle (base = plant crop)    
 First ratoon 0.014 -0.115 -0.085 
 Second ratoon 0.309 -0.012 0.041 
 Third ratoon -0.036 -0.059 -0.057 
 Fourth ratoon 0.023 -0.011 -0.011 
Sandy soil (base = loamy soil) 0.067 0.046 0.049 
Outgrower (base = plantation) 0.175   
Note: the derivatives/gradients of the logarithmic input variables are equal to the output 
elasticities of these inputs; the derivatives/gradients of the production cycle represent the joint 
effects of the two variables that indicate the production cycle.  
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Table B3. Optimal bandwidths and significance levels for the gross margin model 
Variable Bandwidth P-value 
log(plots size) 0.888 <0.001 
Duration of the growing period +∞ <0.001 
Two rainy seasons (base = 1 rainy season) 0.764 0.008 
Planting/ratooning month 0.348 <0.001 
Plant crop vs. ratoon crop 0.157 <0.001 
Production cycle 0.205 <0.001 
Soil type (sandy soil vs. loamy soil) 0.573 0.001 
Plantation vs. outgrower 0.176 <0.001 
 
Table B4. Mean values of estimated derivatives/gradients for the gross margin model 
Variable 
Derivative/gradient 
Outgrower Plantation 
Entire 
sample 
log(plot size) 
 
0.886 0.992 0.976 
Duration of the growing period (months) 0.048 0.015 0.020 
Two rainy seasons (base = 1 rainy season) 0.006 -0.008 -0.005 
Planting/ratooning months (base = previous month)    
 November 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 
 December 0.046 0.007 0.010 
 January 0.029 0.001 0.008 
 February 0.012 0.032 0.026 
 March 0.149 0.030 0.038 
 April 0.011 -0.039 -0.033 
 May -0.075 -0.193 -0.187 
 June 0.031 0.057 0.056 
Production cycle (base = plant crop)    
 First ratoon -0.106 -0.235 -0.205 
 Second ratoon 0.258 -0.102 -0.042 
 Third ratoon -0.203 -0.125 -0.133 
 Fourth ratoon -0.189 -0.091 -0.093 
Sandy soil (base = loamy soil) 0.069 0.029 0.035 
Outgrower (base = plantation) 0.214 0.076 0.096 
Note: the derivatives/gradients of the production cycle represent the joint effects of the two 
variables that indicate the production cycle.  
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Appendix C: supplementary figures 
 
Figure C1. Effects of outgrower management (compared to factory management) on 
productivity on plots that are operated by the factory and on plots that are operated by 
outgrowers (unconstrained model). 
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Figure C2. Distribution of the effects of outgrower management (compared to factory 
management) on plot level productivity on all plots in the sample. 
 
Figure C3. Effects of outgrower management (compared to factory management) on plot-
level productivity under different production cycles. 
 
Figure C4. Effects of outgrower management (compared to factory management) on plot-
level productivity on plots with different numbers of rainy seasons in the growing period. 
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